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Essay
The Future of Multidistrict Litigation
JAY TIDMARSH & DANIELA PEINADO WELSH
The occasion for this Essay is the fiftieth anniversary of the
enactment of the multidistrict-litigation statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
Multidistrict litigation has quietly become a central feature of
federal litigation, sweeping one-third or more of all federal civil
cases each year into aggregate proceedings. Recent commentary on
multidistrict litigation has been highly critical of the “Wild West”
quality of the proceedings, which arguably benefit repeat-player
lawyers at the expense of their clients’ interests and autonomy.
Reform of the process now seems likely. This Essay begins by
describing the features, most historically contingent, that have
brought multidistrict litigation to this crossroads. Using these
features as its foundation, the Essay demonstrates that they have
combined to create a form of action not unlike an opt-in class action,
but without the formal procedural protections that class actions
contain. Turning to the future, the Essay suggests alternate paths
for reform: one that brings multidistrict litigation into closer
alignment with Rule 23 and one that pulls multidistrict litigation
back to a more modest discovery-coordinating process that mirrors
Congress’s original design for § 1407. Both paths leave large,
albeit different, gaps in the handling of aggregate litigation. The
Essay closes by arguing that the two paths can be blended into a
better multidistrict process.
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The Future of Multidistrict Litigation
JAY TIDMARSH * & DANIELA PEINADO WELSH **
INTRODUCTION
The anniversary of major legislation creates an occasion to reflect on its
accomplishments and future direction. Now in its fiftieth year, the
multidistrict litigation (MDL) statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, was not regarded as
major legislation when it was created.1 And the MDL process began
modestly enough. In its first nine years, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation2 consolidated fewer than 5,600 federal civil actions in total.3
Today, however, the MDL process is arguably the central feature in
federal litigation. Over the past five years, the Judicial Panel has
consolidated an average of slightly more than 42,100 civil actions each
year.4 Presently, more than 143,500 cases—or substantially more than one-

*

Judge James J. Clynes, Jr., Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
Litigation Associate, Morrison & Foerster LLP. J.D., Notre Dame Law School.
1
28 U.S.C. § 1407 was enacted on April 29, 1968. Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (1968). The
statute was originally intended to apply principally to antitrust, air-crash, products-liability, patent, and
securities cases. See 114 CONG. REC. H4925 (daily ed. March 4, 1968) (statement of Rep. Celler) (“This
legislation grows out of the experiences of the Federal courts in processing the massive multidistrict
antitrust litigation . . . .”); id. at H4928 (statement of Rep. McClory) (“[The statute] is necessary in certain
instances of mass litigation which have arisen recently with regard to antitrust damage suits, product
liability claims, patent infringement litigation and similar cases where more than one jurisdiction may be
involved.”). For a historical overview of the passage of § 1407, see Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical
Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831, 847–63 (2017).
2
Section 1407 established the Judicial Panel, a seven-member body composed of federal judges
and tasked with determining both whether to transfer cases pending in different federal districts and, if
consolidation is appropriate, which the district judge should preside over the proceeding. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(a), (b), (d) (2012).
3
Of this number, the Panel transferred 3,075 actions. Another 2,498 actions were originally filed
in transferee districts and then consolidated. Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 583 n.62 (1978).
4
Of this number, the Panel on average consolidated slightly more than 5,450 cases per fiscal year.
An average of just over 36,650 actions per year were originally filed in the transferee districts and then
consolidated. See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. (2015), (2016), (2017), (2018) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ANALYSIS], available at
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/statistics-info?field_type_value_1%5B%5D=Fiscal+Year (listing the
number of actions that were transferred, originally filed in transferee courts, and subject to § 1407
proceedings each fiscal year from September 1968 to September 2018). For the most recent year-end
statistical analysis, see id. (2018). Each year’s analysis provides both actions transferred or filed in the
present year and an adjusted total of cases transferred or filed in the prior year. The figures provided in
the text and in this note use the adjusted figures for each fiscal year except 2018, for which an adjusted
total is not yet available.
**
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third of all federal civil lawsuits—are pending in an MDL proceeding.5
Because most cases are finally resolved in the MDL forum,6 the cadre of
“transferee judges”7 who oversee MDL proceedings dispense the only
justice that one-third of all federal civil litigants receive. MDL proceedings
also exercise outsized influence on state court litigation: transferee judges
often coordinate pretrial activities with their state court counterparts,8 and
global settlements in MDL cases are sometimes held open to state court
litigants as well.9
The Congress that created § 1407 did not envision this expansive role.10
The MDL process was designed to coordinate repetitive discovery, a task
5

See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS REPORT – DISTRIBUTION
PENDING
MDL
DOCKETS
BY
DISTRICT
5
(2019),
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_District-April-15-2019.pdf
(reporting 143,664 pending MDL cases). Because reports on pending civil cases lag behind the reports
on pending MDL cases, the most recent apples-to-apples comparison is from September 2018, when
156,511 MDL cases were pending, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 5, out of a total of 372,820
pending federal civil cases, ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS – CIVIL CASES
FILED,
TERMINATED,
&
PENDING
tbl.C–1
(2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c1_0930.2018.pdf. Thus, as of September
2018, 42.0% of all federal civil lawsuits were a part of an MDL proceeding.
6
See STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (2018), supra note 4, at 3 (explaining that since its inception in 1968
through September 2017, the MDL process has resulted in the transfer of 673,104 cases, of which
516,593 cases had been terminated; only 16,728 of the terminated cases—or 3.24%—had been remanded
to their original transferor forums).
7
The “transferee judge” is the judge to whom the seven-member Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation assigns a multidistrict proceeding. See Weigel, supra note 3, at 575–77 (describing the roles
of the Judicial Panel, the transferor court, and the transferee court).
8
See EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SURVEY OF TRANSFEREE JUDGES IN MDL
PROCEEDINGS REGARDING COORDINATION WITH PARALLEL STATE PROCEEDINGS 1 (2011) (stating that
60% of MDL judges coordinate or communicate with state-court judges presiding in parallel state-court
lawsuits).
9
See In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708
(DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (detailing settlement terms that were
crafted to include MDL plaintiffs, plaintiffs in state court cases, and potential plaintiffs who had not yet
filed lawsuits); Margaret S. Thomas, Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements,
63 EMORY L.J. 1339, 1381 (2014) (describing the “emergence of the transjurisdictional MDL settlement
trend”).
10
The push for a multidistrict litigation statute began in 1961, when Chief Justice Warren appointed
the Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United States District Courts. The Committee
was established to consider ways to cope with discovery problems in multiple-district litigation,
particularly antitrust cases. See Francis J. Nyhan, Comment, A Survey of Federal Multidistrict Litigation,
15 VILL. L. REV. 916, 919 (1970). As Professor Bradt’s pathbreaking account about the passage of § 1407
has shown, the judges and scholars who shepherded the MDL statute to passage were prescient enough
to envision the modern scope of multidistrict litigation. See Bradt, supra note 1, at 916 (“[T]he MDL
statute is now playing essentially the role [the statute’s proponents] expected it would.”). Our point is
different: Nothing in § 1407’s legislative history suggested that members of Congress were aware that
the statute would have its present impact; indeed, it is unlikely that the statute would have received
unanimous support in both chambers had members of Congress foreseen multidistrict litigation’s
trajectory. Cf. id. at 882 (noting ways in which the judges pushing to secure passage of § 1407 were
sometimes disingenuous in their representations).
OF
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that transferee judges were to accomplish through common discovery
orders, centralized document depositories, and depositions that could be
used in individual cases on remand.11 Once discovery concluded, the statute
required the Panel to remand to their transferor forums all cases not resolved
in the MDL proceeding.12
The evolution of multidistrict litigation into a mass-resolution form has
divided commentators. Seizing on the lack of formal structures or individual
protections, many have expressed concerns that MDL proceedings have
become the Wild West of aggregation law, with all of the agency costs and
diminished autonomy of class actions but little of Rule 23’s judicial
authority to check the rapacity and self-interest of repeat-player MDL
counsel.13 But other commentators regard the flexibility in the present MDL
system as a desirable, or at least a necessary, means to ensure that mass
wrongdoers are held to account and that victims receive a modicum of
justice—justice that alternative measures cannot provide as efficiently, if at
all.14
11

These three techniques—and only these techniques—merited specific mention in the House and
Senate reports on the legislation that became 28 U.S.C. § 1407. They were highlighted because the
impetus behind the Judicial Conference’s request to establish a multidistrict proceeding was a set of
nettlesome electrical equipment antitrust lawsuits that the coordinated efforts of the thirty-odd federal
judges had resolved. Their success resulted from adoption of the three techniques. See H.R. REP. NO.
1130 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1899; S. REP. NO. 90-454, at 3–4 (1967); Weigel,
supra note 3, at 575.
12
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (“Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or
before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it
shall have been previously terminated . . . .”).
13
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L.
REV. 319, 339–40 (2008) (“[T]he MDL judge’s tactics undermine consent as a justification [for the loss
of litigants’ day in court].”); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70
VAND. L. REV. 67, 86 (2017) (“The absence of clear adequate representation guideposts and the class
action’s policing power has left judges looking to repeat players for guidance and advice about what
happens elsewhere.”); Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute
Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 541 (2013) (“[T]he attorneys involved in aggregate litigation
devised a means for disposing of large-scale litigation unburdened by exacting judicial scrutiny or
jurisprudential constraints conferred by the class action rule.”); Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba,
One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural
Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 111 (2015) (“The substantive rights of [MDL] litigants are adjudicated
collectively without any possibility of a transparent, adversary adjudication of whether . . . the interests
of the individual claimants will be fully protected by those parties and attorneys representing their
interests . . . .”).
14
See, e.g., Bradt, supra note 1, at 914–15 (“MDL’s incorporation of traditional norms of individual
control insulate the structure from the kinds of due process attacks that plagued the class action . . . . In
a world in which trials are increasingly rare and pretrial procedure is dominant, . . . MDL is the poster
child for twenty-first-century procedure.” (footnotes omitted)); Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil
Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1675 (2017) (describing interviews with MDL judges who described MDLs as
“immensely satisfying” and who “resist[ed] at all cost imposing rules—whether in the [Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure] or through uniform federal procedural common law—on the MDL process”); id. at 1710
(“MDLs demand that we pay attention to the nationalization of litigation, the limits of the [Federal Rules],
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The present debate suggests that multidistrict litigation is not yet in a
stable resting place.15 This Essay takes a long-term view of multidistrict
litigation’s progression, focusing on how past practices have both created its
present instability and have marked the path for its future development. Part
I describes six practices, each contingent at the time that it developed, that
have transformed § 1407 into its present form. Part II argues that these
practices have pushed the MDL proceedings close to a de facto opt-in class
action.16 This movement has generated predictable problems—as well as
predictable proposed solutions, which, if enacted, would cement the MDL
process into a class-action form.
Part III sketches two alternative visions for multidistrict litigation in the
next half-century. One vision extends the present trend line, positing
changes in other doctrinal and structural practices that seem inevitable if the
MDL process continues on its present path toward an opt-in class action.
This vision is not above criticism: it strikes the balance between autonomy
and collective action decidedly in favor of the latter, leaving unoccupied the
ground between autonomous individual litigation and collective redress that
the MDL process once occupied.
Giving greater weight to individual autonomy, the second vision
requires a retreat toward the discovery-coordinating ground that § 1407 was
meant to claim.17 A simple doctrinal change, reversing one of the six past
practices, will accomplish this rollback. This vision enhances the control of
plaintiffs over their cases—albeit at the cost of less efficient resolution of
aggregate litigation in the short term.
Both directions have flaws. We close by suggesting that the alteration
of another past practice can blend the two visions into an MDL process that
achieves greater benefits with fewer side effects.
I. HOW WE GOT HERE
Of the six developments that have shaped the MDL process, three
involve specific powers assumed by the transferee judge, two arise from
other doctrinal changes that affected the scope of multidistrict proceedings,
and one concerns the structural relationship between the Judicial Panel and
transferee judges. By the early 2000s, this constellation of factors had
and the real-world challenges of access to court under the traditional model.”).
15
See Redish & Karaba, supra note 13, at 112 n.22 and accompanying text (collecting sources
showing the continuing debate on the “merits of MDL”).
16
With justification, multidistrict litigation has been described as a “quasi-class action.” See, e.g.,
In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that an MDL proceeding
“may be properly characterized as a quasi-class action”); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The QuasiClass Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 107, 124 (2010) (discussing the reasons opt-out is acceptable in class actions but not MDLs); see
also infra Part II.
17
See infra Part III(B).
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ripened to form the core of the present MDL process.
The first development occurred almost immediately: early transferee
judges asserted the power to rule on all pretrial motions—including
dispositive motions to dismiss or for summary judgment—that arose during
the MDL proceeding.18 Although not a given, this exercise of power was no
surprise. Section 1407(b) gave the transferee judge the power to conduct
“pretrial proceedings,” and dispositive motions are undeniably part of the
pretrial process.19 The House Report contemplated that “the transferee
district court would have authority to render summary judgment [and] to
control and limit pretrial proceedings.”20 But a fair-minded reading of the
Report shows that this statement was very much a secondary thought. Most
of the House Report focused on the beneficial effects that consolidating
litigation would have on discovery.21 For its part, the Senate Report focused
entirely on the transferee court’s power to superintend common discovery;
it was silent about the power to rule on dispositive motions.22 The Senate
Report noted, however, that “remand to the originating district . . . will be
desirable” to conduct supplemental case-specific discovery.23
Some early cases, and even a few later ones, expressed doubt about the
transferee court’s broad power to enter a judgment affecting all consolidated
cases, as opposed to a limited power to resolve a specific case on grounds
unique to that case.24 But such hesitance dissipated, and today the MDL
18

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)–(7) (listing seven case-dispositive motions to dismiss); FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(a) (permitting the entry of summary judgment when no genuine issue of material fact precludes the
entry of judgment as a matter of law); Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 667–68 (6th Cir. 1973)
(rejecting the argument that the MDL transferee court “did not have the authority or power to grant
summary judgment”); Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 365, 371
(D. Del. 1971) (“[W]hile the impetus for the adoption of the legislation was a desire to simplify discovery
procedures in multidistrict litigation, it was the intent of Congress to grant to the transferee district court
under § 1407 the power to pass upon all pretrial motions, including motions to dismiss, motions for
judgment on the pleadings, or motions for summary judgment.”). The Judicial Panel acknowledged,
without negative comment, that transferee judges were exercising these powers. See, e.g., In re
Multidistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust Litig. Involving Gypsum Wallboard, 302 F. Supp.
794, 794 (J.P.M.L. 1969) (“Motions to quash service or dismiss for lack of jurisdiction are being routinely
considered by courts to which multidistrict litigation has previously been transferred . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
19
Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2012) (providing magistrate judges the power to determine “any
pretrial matter” with certain exceptions, including “a motion . . . for summary judgment [or] to dismiss”).
20
See H.R. REP. NO. 1130, supra note 11, at 3.
21
See id. (discussing the “desirable improvements in judicial administration” and the “substantial
benefit” that would result from implementation of a Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation).
22
See S. REP. NO. 90–454, supra note 11, at 2, 4–5 (1967).
23
Id.
24
See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.—Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 367 (3d Cir.
1993) (“Apparently, transferee courts frequently terminate consolidated cases in practice.”); In re
Multidistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust Litig. Involving Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control
Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398, 402 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (“The function of the judge assigned cases pursuant to . . .
Section 1407, is to coordinate pretrial proceedings with the view of returning cases to the transferor judge
in condition to be tried expeditiously to the benefit of all parties to the litigation.”). In its early opinions
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court is seen as a forum for resolving any pretrial matter.
The second development involved a particular pretrial motion: the
motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. Unlike § 1407(a), § 1404(a)
permits a judge in any federal case to transfer a case to another district
“where it might have been brought”25 for all purposes, including trial.
Transferee judges in MDL litigation soon began to engage in a practice
known as “self-transfer”: stepping into the shoes of the judges from the
transferor forums, MDL judges entered § 1404 orders transferring
multidistricted cases for all purposes, including trial, to the transferee district
itself.26 Although self-transfer did not always work (some consolidated cases
could not have been brought originally in the MDL forum), in many
instances a single order permitted the transferee judge to exercise plenary
authority over consolidated cases.27
Lexecon abruptly terminated nearly thirty years of this practice, holding
that self-transfer thwarted the Judicial Panel’s statutory obligation to remand
cases to their transferor forums for trial.28 By then, however, the die had been
cast. MDL courts viewed themselves as the forum for achieving the final
resolution of big, sprawling lawsuits. Although Lexecon may have banned
one technique to bring MDL cases to conclusion, few cases in the 1990s
were going to trial anyway.29 Summary judgment and global settlements
(aided, perhaps, by a few bellwether trials30) became MDL judges’ tools of

recognizing the power of a transferee judge to grant a dispositive motion, the Judicial Panel always
discussed the power in terms of motions to quash service of process or to dismiss a specific lawsuit—not
in terms of a power to resolve the entire litigation. See, e.g., In re Duarte, Cal. Air Crash Disaster on June
6, 1971, 354 F. Supp. 278, 279 (J.P.M.L. 1973) (observing that the defendant’s motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction is “clearly a pretrial motion which may appropriately be decided by the
transferee court”); Gypsum Wallboard, 302 F. Supp. at 794 (same).
25
As a result of an amendment in 2011, § 1404(a) also permits transfer to a district “to which all
parties have consented.” Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No.
112–63, § 204, 125 Stat. 758, 764 (2011). Before this amendment, cases could be transferred only to a
district in which venue would have been proper had the case been filed there originally. See, e.g.,
Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 366 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[R]estrict transfer as the
Court does to those very few places where the defendant was originally amendable to process . . . .”).
26
For the earliest appellate imprimatur on self-transfer, see Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 124
(2d Cir. 1971) (“[W]hile the Multidistrict Litigation Panel would have no power to transfer these cases
for trial under section 1404(a), the judge to whom the cases have been assigned has such power here as
he would in any other case.”).
27
See, e.g., id. (commenting approvingly on self-transfer where transfer by the Panel would have
been impossible).
28
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998).
29
See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459, 461 (2004) (noting a recent drop in
the rate of federal civil trials from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002).
30
See Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323,
2338 (2008) (“[B]ellwether trials can precipitate and inform settlement negotiations by indicating future
trends, that is, by providing guidance on how similar claims may fare before subsequent juries.”).
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31

choice to wrestle mass disputes to the ground. Today, remand of a
multidistricted case to its transferor forum for trial is a rare event.32
The third development was the transferee judges’ assertion of the
authority to appoint lead counsel for MDL plaintiffs. Relying on their
inherent judicial power, courts had previously appointed lead counsel in
actions consolidated under Rule 42(a).33 By means of the adequaterepresentation doctrine, courts also asserted the power to appoint counsel in
class actions brought under Rule 23.34 It was but a short step for transferee
judges to claim the same power. Once again, however, the step was far from
a given. The 1972 edition of Manual for Complex Litigation counseled
against judicial selection of lead counsel, advocating instead that the lawyers
work out their own structure.35 This view shifted rapidly. By 1977, a pair of
influential decisions resolved the matter decisively in favor of the MDL
court’s power to appoint.36
The influence of the appointment power on the present structure of
multidistrict litigation cannot be overstated. Appointing lead counsel
establishes the dynamic, familiar in corporate and class-action settings, in
which control of an asset is divided from its ownership—a division that
imports all of the agency-cost baggage of the corporate and class-action
worlds into multidistrict litigation.37 Appointment of counsel also limits the
31
See, e.g., In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., Emp’t Practices Litig., No. 3:05–MD–527
RLM, 2017 WL 2672767, at *1–2 (N.D. Ind. June 19, 2017) (describing a combination of processes,
including summary judgment, potential bellwether trials, and mediation that led the parties to negotiate
a class-action settlement); see also In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The law favors settlement, particularly in class actions and other
complex cases where substantial judicial resources can be conserved by avoiding formal litigation.”); id.
(“[C]ourts should favor the use of devices that tend to foster negotiated solutions to these actions.”).
32
See supra note 6 (observing that in 2017, only 16,600 of 626,938 multidistrict cases were
remanded by the Panel).
33
FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a). The seminal case is MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1958).
34
See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 496–97 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that class counsel
adequately represented the class), rev’d on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970). A 2003
amendment to Rule 23 added an explicit requirement that the court appoint class counsel only after
considering a number of factors addressing “counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B). Rule 23(g) confirmed existing best practices; cases
had been examining the adequacy of class counsel since the 1966 amendment to Rule 23.
35
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.92 (1972) (“While the court should not, in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, select and appoint lead counsel, the court can request the parties
to select such counsel and encourage the use of lead counsel.”).
36
See Vincent v. Hughes Air W., Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 759–61 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that the
district court had authority to appoint lead counsel); In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on
December 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1011–12 (5th Cir. 1977) (affirming the court’s power to appoint lead
counsel).
37
See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1273, 1291–300 (2012) (describing agency-cost issues in MDL litigation); cf. Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12–27 (1991) (analyzing agency-cost
problems in class actions).
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claims and arguments of plaintiffs, making it easier for transferee judges to
generate broadly applicable procedural, substantive, or evidentiary rulings
that can channel the litigation into a global summary judgment or settlement.
Finally, the power to appoint counsel creates a repeat-player phenomenon,
in which informal norms, connections, and relationships triumph over
formal legal structures—a dynamic that may lead MDL counsel to “privilege
self-interest over clients’ interests.”38
The fourth factor in the rise of the modern MDL is the decline of the
class action. During the 1980s, some courts began to take an expansive view
of class actions, making them more available to handle mass litigation
seeking damages.39 In the mid-1990s, however, influential appellate-court
decisions substantially curbed this growth,40 and in the later 1990s a pair of
Supreme Court decisions acted as further retardants.41 With some
exceptions, the Supreme Court has maintained its dubious attitude toward
the broad use of class actions ever since.42 And lower courts have followed
suit.43
Pushing Rule 23 toward the sideline has not, however, ended the types
of mass disputes that class actions might have addressed. Without the class
action as a viable alternative in many cases, the MDL process has stepped
38
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation:
The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1447 (2017).
39
See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472–73 (5th Cir. 1986) (certifying a Rule
23(b)(3) class in an asbestos case); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 787–92
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) class in a toxic-tort case; rejecting certification under Rules
23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2)).
40
See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a Rule 23(b)(3)
class for lawsuits of smokers claiming deceptive advertising); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069,
1090 (6th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a Rule 23(b)(3) class in a medical-device case); In re Rhone–Poulenc
Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297–99 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a Rule 23(b)(3) class in a case of tainted
blood products).
41
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864–65 (1999) (rejecting an asbestos settlement
class action for its failure to meet the terms of Rule 23(b)(1)(B)); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (rejecting an asbestos settlement class action for its failure to meet the terms of
Rule 23(a)(4) and 23(b)(3)).
42
See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 29–36 (2013) (rejecting an antitrust class for
failing to meet the terms of Rule 23(b)(3)); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 338–39 (2011)
(rejecting an employment-discrimination class for failing to meet the terms of Rule 23(a)(2) and
23(b)(2)). The trend is not universal. See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045
(2016) (holding that common statistical proof can be used to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance
requirement); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 459 (2013) (holding that
materiality is a common question that can help to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement).
43
See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008) (rejecting a
Rule 23(b)(3) class in an antitrust case); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir.
2006), clarified on reh’g, 483 F.3d 70, 72–73 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting a Rule 23(b)(3) class in a
securities-fraud case); In re St. Jude Med., Inc., Silizone Heart Valve Prods. Liab. Litig., 425 F.3d 1116,
1117 (8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a Rule 23(b)(2) medical-monitoring class). Again, the trend is not
universal. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2004) (certifying a Rule
23(b)(3) class for federal RICO fraud claims, but not for state-law claims).
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into the breach —not as the ideal vehicle for aggregating related cases,
perhaps, but as the only device with any reasonable prospect of achieving
single-forum resolution of dispersed litigation.
This marginalization does not mean that class actions have no role in
multidistrict litigation.45 On the contrary, in circumstances in which class
actions remain viable, the avoidance of dueling, overlapping class actions is
a common reason that the Judicial Panel cites to consolidate cases.46
Moreover, MDL judges sometimes use settlement class actions to achieve
global settlements.47 Nonetheless, as commentators have observed, the
center of power in aggregate litigation has shifted from class actions to
multidistrict litigation.48 In the wake of this development, some transferee
judges now view the MDL as a “quasi-class action,”49 in which a single,
mass resolution of all claims is the goal.
A fifth factor contributing to the shape of the modern MDL process is
external to, but constitutive of, MDL practice. Beginning before MDLs or
44
See Emery G. Lee III et al., Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination, 12 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 221–22 (2015) (describing the rise in the number of requests for MDL
treatment over the past twenty years).
45
Indeed, “[m]ore than seventy-five percent of MDLs involve class actions.” Gluck, supra note 14,
at 1695.
46
See, e.g., In re Litig. Arising from Termination of Ret. Plan for Emps. of Fireman’s Fund Ins.
Co., 422 F. Supp. 287, 290 (J.P.M.L. 1976) (“Another compelling reason for transfer of these actions to
a single district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings is the need to eliminate the
possibility of overlapping or inconsistent class determinations by courts of coordinate jurisdiction.”). But
see In re S. Ry. Emp’t Practices Litig., 441 F. Supp. 926, 927 (J.P.M.L. 1977) (declining to consolidate
two cases with potentially overlapping class actions); cf. In re Chrysler LLC 2.7 Liter V–6 Engine Oil
Sludge Prods. Liab. Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373 (J.P.M.L. 2009) (centralizing five nonoverlapping putative statewide class actions for discovery purposes, but suggesting that the transferee
judge may eventually wish to request remand of the cases to their transferor forums for separate classcertification determinations).
47
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox
of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 400–02 (2014) (describing how an MDL proceeding relied on
settlement class actions to resolve claims arising from the Gulf oil spill); Mullenix, supra note 13, at 539
(“This proliferation of MDL proceedings has been married to the settlement class device.”). MDL judges
sometimes accomplish global settlements without reliance on Rule 23. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (acknowledging that a case had “many of the
characteristics of a class action,” even though it was not a settlement class action).
48
See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 79
(2015) (“Waning class certification . . . forced multidistrict litigation to become the primary means for
resolving aggregate litigation.”); Silver & Miller, supra note 16, at 113–14 (noting that many MDL cases
could not meet the present requirements of Rule 23); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From
Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN.
L. REV. 775, 791–94, 806 (2010) (providing data documenting “several shifts in practice appearing to
lead to the current use of nonclass settlements to resolve mass-tort litigation”).
49
See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (E.D. La. 2009) (“While an MDL
is distinct from a class action, the substantial similarities between the two warrant the treatment of an
MDL as a quasi-class action.”); Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. at 122 (stating that the Zyprexa
products-liability MDL “may be properly characterized as a quasi-class action, subject to general
equitable powers of the courts”).
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post-1966 class actions stalked the earth, but then strongly confirmed by
MDL and class-action practices of the past fifty years, strong judicial
management is now a fundamental tenet of complex litigation.50 Indeed, the
case-management approach has spread far beyond the complex cases that
gave it birth and has been the new normal for all federal litigation since
1983.51
Case management is not, however, a set of defined practices to be
applied uniformly in each case. To the contrary, case management provides
judges with a range of possible tools to aid in narrowing issues and
developing evidence, as well as the discretion to apply different, outcomeaffecting techniques to different cases.52
A common component of case management is to seek resolution through
issue-narrowing dispositive motions or settlement.53 Trial is often regarded
as a failure of the management process.54 Transferee judges and MDL
lawyers who have grown up in this case-management culture therefore see
MDL proceedings as their responsibility to resolve—in other words, to
dispose of on motion or to settle.55 In this mindset, remand of cases to their
50
On the development of case management as a response to post-World War II antitrust cases and
its movement into the litigation mainstream, see JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER TRANGSRUD, MODERN
COMPLEX LITIGATION 716–17 (2d ed. 2010); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374,
390–91 (1982) (discussing the “new ‘forms’” of litigation involving increased judicial management).
51
See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 55 (2010) (“[A]mendments to Rule 16 and Rule 26 reflected the
[rulemakers’] continued commitment to case management as an effective means to combat cost and delay
and to encourage rational, merits-based settlements.” (footnote omitted)).
52
See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)–(c) (listing more than twenty case-management techniques, a few of
which are mandatory but most of which are discretionary); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Searching for Reorganization Realities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257, 1285 (1994) (noting that in
certain bankruptcy cases, “different forms of judicial case management may significantly affect
outcomes”); Kenneth M. Vorrasi, England’s Reform to Alleviate the Problems of Civil Process: A
Comparison of Judicial Case Management in England and the United States, 30 J. LEGIS. 361, 373
(2004) (observing that in the United Kingdom, “the enhanced case management powers—calling for
efficient track allocation—authorize judges to make outcome-determinative decisions about each case.”).
53
See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(A) (permitting the judge to “consider and take appropriate action”
with respect to “formulating and simplifying the issues, and eliminating frivolous claims or defenses”);
id. at 16(c)(2)(E) (permitting the judge to “consider and take appropriate action” with respect to “the
appropriateness and timing of summary adjudication under Rule 56”); id. at 16(c)(2)(I) (permitting the
judge to “consider and take appropriate action” with respect to “settling the case”).
54
See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1,
50 (1987) (“The judicial management movement seems to have created an attitude that a trial represents
judicial failure.” (citation omitted)). On the evolution of case management from an issue-narrowing
system to a settlement-fostering system, see E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of
Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 322–26 (1986).
55
See Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict Litigation (MDL–
875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97, 144 (2013) (“As a matter of judicial culture,
remanding cases is viewed as an acknowledgment that the MDL judge has failed to resolve the case, by
adjudication or settlement, during the MDL process. That view, together with the business model of
aggregation and consolidation of cases for settlement, interfered with the litigation of individual cases in
the MDL court.” (footnote omitted)).
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transferor forums is defeat.
A final factor contributing to the scope of modern multidistrict litigation
is structural and, for this reason, easy to overlook. At a very early day, the
Judicial Panel decided to take a hands-off approach to the management and
progress of transferred actions. The Panel fulfills its exact statutory mandate:
deciding whether to consolidate, before whom to consolidate, and whether
to remand.56 But it proclaims no interest in reviewing the transferee judge’s
day-to-day management of the proceeding.57 This approach is consistent
with the language of § 1407,58 but it also leaves the transferee judge as a
virtually unchecked force in the pretrial phase. This division of
responsibility also means that neither the Panel nor the transferee judge bears
full responsibility for the present posture of multidistrict litigation.
Each of these six developments is justifiable on its own. No
development is inconsistent with the terms of § 1407 or with the efficient
processing of multidistrict litigation.59 At the same time, each expands the
power of transferee judges and stunts the growth of doctrines or institutions
that might check the judge’s authority. Although multidistrict litigation has
inched towards the class-action model, analogous protections have not
followed. Unlike a judge in a class action, an MDL judge has no formal
power to review a multidistrict settlement;60 and with no judicial
determination on the settlement’s merits, there is no final judgment from
which MDL plaintiffs might appeal and no way to contest the fairness of the
settlement. A plaintiff who agrees to settle also waives the right to appeal
the transferee judge’s other pretrial rulings, some of which likely shaped the
56
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)–(b) (2012) (granting the Panel the authority to transfer actions for
consolidated pretrial proceedings, to remand actions, and to select the judge or judges to whom the
actions are assigned).
57
See, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 421 (J.P.M.L. 1991)
(“The Panel has neither the power nor the disposition to direct the transferee judge in the exercise of his
powers and discretion in pretrial proceedings.’” (quoting In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp.
484, 489 (J.P.M.L. 1968))); In re Prot. Devices & Equip. & Cent. Station Prot. Serv. Antitrust Cases, 295
F. Supp. 39, 40 (J.P.M.L. 1968) (“Determination of all matters involving questions of class actions shall
be left to the sound judgment of [the transferee judge].”). The Panel has sometimes been sensitive to
management and comity concerns, timing a transfer decision to permit a transferor judge to rule on a
pending motion. See In re Droplets, Inc., Patent Litig., 908 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2012)
(noting that the pendency of a dispositive motion in one case weakened the argument for consolidation).
58
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (granting the Panel the power to select the transferee judge, but not the
power to review day-to-day management).
59
See id. at (a)–(h) (explaining the scope of a Judicial Panel’s authority).
60
Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (requiring, in most instances, a judge to approve a class-action
settlement “only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate”); see Andrew D.
Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105
CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1298 (2017) (noting that most MDLs “structure the settlement as a private
agreement, and all of the claimants who opt in stipulate to the voluntary dismissal of their claims under
Rule 41;” further noting that “[i]t is in this situation where the MDL judge’s authority to review the
settlement is most questionable”). Some MDL judges have claimed such a power in unique cases. See
infra note 86 and accompanying text.
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scope of the relief that the settlement provides. Because MDL plaintiffs’
lawyers can employ a number of powers to herd their plaintiffs toward
settlement,61 no plaintiff may remain to challenge the work of the transferee
judge.62
In short, a series of historically contingent developments has constructed
a judicial form that puts the litigants, the lawyers, and the transferee judge
on an island, with the judge and lawyers enjoying nearly unreviewable
authority to resolve MDL cases.
II. WHERE WE ARE
Concentrating on the major developments that have brought
multidistrict litigation to its present juncture also reveals an essential truth:
the present MDL system operates as a de facto opt-in class action, with the
“class” comprising the MDL plaintiffs who litigate together. At first blush,
this claim seems overdrawn. Although Rule 23 once permitted opt-in, or
“spurious,” class actions,63 the 1966 amendments abolished the form.64
Today Rule 23 authorizes only three mandatory class actions65 and one optout class action.66
Furthermore, multidistrict litigation lacks important attributes of a true
class action. Most obvious, no class representative sues on behalf of
similarly situated claimants,67 each MDL plaintiff asserts his or her own
claim, and each MDL plaintiff retains his or her own lawyer.68 Structural
and procedural protections for absent class members—the right to adequate
61
See D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175,
2177 (2017) (describing settlement provisions and other mechanisms that “tend to strongly encourage
claimants to accept the deal and provide opportunities for defendants to back out if too few do”); Burch
& Williams, supra note 38, at 1504 (further describing four of the most common settlement provisions
designed to force claimants’ acquiescence).
62
Cf. Gluck, supra note 14, at 1706 (explaining that the non-appealability of most discovery orders
and the effort to achieve consensus result in decision-making that evades appellate review).
63
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (1938) (permitting a class action when the right sought to be enforced
was “several, and there [was] a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common
relief [was] sought”); 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1752,
at 30–31 (3d ed. 2005) (stating that the judgment in a “spurious” class action under former Rule 23(a)(3)
directly bound those class members who had either brought the suit or intervened in it but not those class
members who never became parties); Scott Dodson, An Opt-In Option for Class Actions, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 171, 176–77 (2016) (describing the “opt-in mechanism” of former Rule 23(a)(3)).
64
The only widely available opt-in form is the Fair Labor Standard Act’s collective action. See 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018) (permitting employees to bring wage-violation actions on behalf of similarly
situated employees, provided that “[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he
gives his consent in writing to become such a party”).
65
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(2) (providing three forms of mandatory class action).
66
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (providing an opt-out class action).
67
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (authorizing “[o]ne or more members of a class [to] sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members” when certain conditions are met).
68
Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1) (“Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court that certifies a class
must appoint class counsel.”).
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representation, the right to opt out of certain class actions, the right to
notice about a pending settlement and certain other litigation events,71 the
right to object to any proposed settlement,72 the right to judicial review and
approval of any settlement,73 and the right to judicial control over class
counsel’s fees74—also do not carry over to multidistrict litigation. Finally, a
class action is certified for all purposes, not just for pretrial proceedings.75
These formal differences between an opt-in class action and multidistrict
litigation diminish when the MDL process is examined functionally. The
touchstone for both the spurious class action and multidistrict consolidation
is “common” questions of law or fact.76 Although MDL proceedings have
no representative parties, class representatives usually have limited
responsibilities. For the most part, they are figureheads in litigation
controlled by counsel.77 Their formal absence from MDL proceedings is
even less meaningful given that, much like class representatives, bellwether
plaintiffs in multidistrict litigation carry the torch in forging a settlement.78
In addition, even though MDL plaintiffs formally file individual
69

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3)–(4) (requiring that the class representative possess claims or defenses
“typical of the claims or defenses of the class” and that the class representative “fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class”); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (holding that due process
requires adequate representation in order for a judgment to bind class members).
70
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (requiring that notice of a right to opt out be provided to
members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4) (permitting a judge to provide a second optout opportunity to members of a previously certified (b)(3) class at the time of settlement). Class actions
seeking monetary relief are almost always filed under Rule 23(b)(3). See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011) (“[I]ndividualized monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3).”).
71
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (stating that, for mandatory class actions, “the court may direct
appropriate notice to the class”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring that, for a (b)(3) opt-out class
action, “the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances”
and detailing the contents of the notice); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1) (“The court must direct notice in a
reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by [a settlement] proposal.”).
72
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5)(A) (“Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires
court approval . . . .”).
73
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (“[T]he court may approve [a settlement proposal] only after a
hearing and only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate . . . .”).
74
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) (“In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s
fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties' agreement.”). Class members also
enjoy the right to object to a motion to award fees. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h)(2) (“A class member, or a
party from whom payment is sought, may object to the motion.”).
75
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (“At an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a
class representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action.”).
76
For the text of former Rule 23(a)(3), the spurious class-action rule, see supra note 63. For MDL
proceedings, in addition to requiring “one or more common questions of [law or] fact” among cases
“pending in different districts,” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) requires that transfer “will be for the convenience
of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct” of the cases.
77
See Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in Class
Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 165 (1990) (contending that named class plaintiffs have no legal authority
and serve no useful purpose).
78
See Fallon et al., supra note 30, at 2338 (emphasizing the use of MDL proceedings in global
settlements).
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lawsuits, rather than opt into a class action, many lawyers who file their
clients’ cases in federal court are aware of, and may even be angling for,
multidistrict treatment. Indeed, the vast majority of cases consolidated into
an MDL are filed in the district in which the MDL proceeding is pending
with the expectation that the cases will be swept into the MDL proceeding.80
The Panel routinely transfers cases filed in other federal districts (known as
tag-along actions) to the transferee forum.81 By filing in federal court, these
plaintiffs are, for all intents and purposes, opting into the MDL proceeding.
Finally, the formal authority of the class-action judge to appoint class
counsel on behalf of the class is not a major feature distinguishing class
actions from MDL proceedings.82 Transferee judges also appoint lead
counsel in MDL proceedings.83 Although their choice is not formally
constrained by concerns for adequate representation, a transferee judge is
unlikely to appoint counsel with such competence or conflict issues that the
lawyer would fail to clear the adequacy hurdle for class counsel.84 Put
differently, the same adequacy considerations are likely to guide a transferee
judge and a class-action judge. Granted, the transferee judge’s power does
not extend so far as to choose or replace an MDL plaintiff’s original lawyer,
but cases that arrive at an MDL proceeding rarely return to the original
lawyer for trial.85
Similarly, the trend is to provide MDL litigants with other structural and
procedural protections comparable to those enjoyed by class members. In
particular, judges have begun to claim the authority to approve global
settlements in mass aggregations86 and to regulate the fees paid both to MDL
79

See id. at 2325 (“A typical bellwether case often begins as no more than an individual lawsuit . .

. .”).
80

See STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (2018), supra note 4, at 5 (providing data showing that, over the past
two years, approximately ninety percent of cases consolidated in an MDL proceeding are initially filed
in the district in which the MDL proceeding is pending).
81
See MULTIDIST. LIT. R. 7.1 (2016) (discussing the procedures for tag-along actions).
82
See supra text accompanying notes 33–37 (describing the appointment power in both MDL and
class-action cases).
83
See Burch, supra note 48, at 88 (“[T]he [MDL] committee appointment process [is] more akin to
choosing class counsel—where putative class members have no say in who represents them—than to
forming ad hoc attorney groups.”).
84
Cf. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05(c) (Am. Law Inst. 2010)
[hereinafter AGGREGATE LITIGATION] (recommending that in all aggregate proceedings, “[j]udges
should ensure that parties and represented persons are adequately represented.”). But see Burch, supra
note 48, at 88 (“[U]nlike selecting class counsel, judges seem to pay little attention to . . . adequaterepresentation concerns in multidistrict litigation.”).
85
The original lawyer may perform valuable litigation-related services for the client, such as
handling client questions or concerns. See Burch, supra note 48, at 114–15 (explaining the preparation
done by attorneys in this setting). But the power of the original lawyer to shape the conduct of the MDL
proceeding that will likely determine the fate of the client’s case is minimal. See id. at 88 (“The
individually retained attorney has no power to appoint or discharge the leaders who assume control of
her clients’ cases.”).
86
See Mireya Navarro, Judge Rejects Deal on Health Claims of Workers at Ground Zero, N.Y.
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counsel and to the plaintiffs’ original lawyers. Although MDL plaintiffs
have neither a formal right to opt out of multidistrict litigation at its outset
or at the time of settlement, nor a formal right to object to a settlement, optout rights are not a feature of an opt-in class,89 and in any event MDL
plaintiffs can refuse to consent to a settlement, in effect voicing their
objection and opting out.90
Finally, the scope of the preclusive effect of an opt-in class action and
an MDL proceeding are comparable. In both instances, only those who are
formally made parties are bound by a judgment.91
Of course, the analogy between class actions and MDL proceedings is
not perfect. Opt-in class actions are constituted for all purposes, while
multidistrict litigation is for pretrial purposes only.92 Given the rarity of
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2010, at A12 (describing the rejection of a settlement reached between 9/11 first
responders and the City of New York); Mireya Navarro, U.S. District Court Approves Ground Zero
Health Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2010, at A28 (describing the judge’s subsequent approval of a
larger settlement in the same litigation); Howard M. Erichson, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class
Settlements, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2013) (“What I wonder is where [Judge Hellerstein] got
the power to ‘approve’ or ‘reject’ the settlement.”).
87
The authority to regulate the fees of MDL counsel arises from the common-fund (or commonbenefit) doctrine, which dictates that lawyers for a group should be compensated when their work
generates a benefit for the group. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 477–79 (1980) (applying
the common-fund concept to class litigation); Burch, supra note 48, at 102 (“To justify awarding fees to
lead [MDL] lawyers, judges have borrowed ad hoc from class-action law’s common-fund doctrine,
contract principles, ethics, and equity.” (footnote omitted)). Transferee judges can be instrumental in
establishing the common fund. An early case-management order often requires the plaintiffs’ original
lawyers to enter into fee-transfer agreements, in which the original lawyers agree to pay to lead MDL
counsel a set percentage (usually two to six percent) of the gross proceeds ultimately obtained by the
client. See id. at 106 (explaining the application of fee-transfer arrangements).
88
See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 564 (E.D. La. 2009) (capping the fees
payable by MDL plaintiffs to thirty-two percent of any settlement proceeds); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab.
Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 496–97 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (capping fees for some MDL cases at twenty
percent and others at thirty-five percent, with special masters enjoying a power to adjust the amounts
upward or downward).
89
See supra text accompanying notes 67–75 (describing the differing attributes of multidistrict
litigation and true class actions).
90
Of course, MDL counsel can employ tactics to keep plaintiffs from exercising these rights. See
supra note 61 and accompanying text. But many of the same tactics can also be used in opt-out class
actions. Cf. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS
IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES
52–53 (1996) (reporting a low rate of opting out). One proposal to limit the right of MDL plaintiffs to
refuse to participate in a settlement is the aggregate-settlement rule, in which plaintiffs agree at the outset
of litigation to be bound by the majority vote of plaintiffs who are represented by the same lawyer. See
AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 84, § 3.17(b) (recommending an aggregate-settlement rule as long
as a “substantial majority vote” of all claimants approves the settlement). But see Tax Auth., Inc. v.
Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 514–15, 522 (N.J. 2006) (rejecting, prospectively, an aggregatesettlement rule as inconsistent with a lawyer’s professional obligations to obtain consent from each
client).
91
See Bradt, infra note 92 (explaining that there is no binding effect on absentees in an MDL case);
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)–(3) (noting the binding effect of a class judgment on class members).
92
See Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL’s Roots as a Class Action
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remand in MDL litigation, however, the all-purpose nature of a spurious
class action is not as significant a difference from an MDL proceeding as it
might initially appear. Next, the trend toward transferee-judge review of
settlements and attorney’s fees is controversial and far from pervasive.93
Moreover, while a class must satisfy numerous elements (numerosity,
commonality, typicality, adequacy, and more) that collectively assure
adequate representation and efficient resolution,94 an MDL proceeding may
commence with only two cases raising common issues.95
We are not the first to notice close connections between multidistrict
litigation and class actions96 or to compare MDL proceedings to opt-in class
actions.97 But we press hard on the analogy to opt-in class actions for two
reasons. First, as the rest of this Part explains, the movement of the MDL
process toward a quasi-class action explains its present instability. Second,
as the following Part describes, the class-action analogy adumbrates one of
two potential futures for multidistrict litigation.
Class actions promise great benefits, but they also impose certain
costs.98 Two sets of costs are primary: loss of individual autonomy and
agency costs.99 These costs have proven sufficiently concerning that federal
Alternative, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1711, 1741 (2017) (“The justification for [§ 1407’s failure to provide an
opt-out right] is the lack of a binding effect on absentees in an MDL case.”); Burch, supra note 48, at 73
(explaining that multidistrict litigation is supposed to be used for pretrial purposes only).
93
See Burch, supra note 48, at 109–18 (expressing doubt about the ability of MDL judges to cap
the fees of clients’ original lawyers or to approve or reject aggregate settlements); Erichson, supra note
86, at 1024 (calling judicial approval or rejection of non-class settlements “a question of power” and
stating that “[c]laims belong to claimants, not to the judge”). The influential Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation stopped short of endorsing judicial approval of settlements or attorney’s fees in
non-class aggregate litigation. See AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 84, §§ 3.01, 3.15–3.18
(providing general principles to guide aggregate settlements). The one exception was the controversial
recommendation to create the aggregate-settlement rule. See supra note 84 (describing the rule). In that
instance, the settlement was subject to trial court and appellate review to ensure that it was “fair and
reasonable.” AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 84, §§ 3.17(d), 3.18(a).
94
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b) (listing the elements necessary for class certification).
95
See In re CBS Licensing Antitrust Litig., 328 F. Supp. 511, 511–13 (J.P.M.L. 1971)
(consolidating two cases).
96
Many have characterized MDL as a quasi-class action. See, e.g., Silver & Miller, supra note 16,
at 107 (studying the emerging quasi-class action approach to MDL management); see also Bradt, supra
note 92, at 1720–31 (tracing the parallel histories of the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 (governing class
actions) and the 1968 legislative enactment of § 1407 (governing MDLs)).
97
See Jaime Dodge, Privatizing Mass Settlement, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 335, 394 n.222 (2014)
(characterizing multidistrict litigation as an opt-in procedure, but not specifically pursuing the analogy
to an opt-in class action).
98
See JAY TIDMARSH, CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE PRINCIPLES TO PROMOTE FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY
§§ 1.03–04 (2014) (comparing benefits such as deterrence; lowering transaction costs; equalizing
investment incentives; buying peace; and ensuring the fair treatment of victims to costs, such as overdeterrence; increasing transaction costs; creating agency costs; depriving individuals of their “day in
court”; and expanding judicial power).
99
Another critique often raised against class actions is their threat to democratic governance. For
an extended argument to that effect, see MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 3 (Stan. Univ. Press 2009) (“[T]he
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judges have been unwilling to engage in more adventuresome uses of the
class-action form.100
As multidistrict litigation has moved into the space that restrictive
interpretations of Rule 23 have left void, precisely the same concerns now
haunt § 1407.101 Although some defenders of the MDL status quo exist,102
the drumbeat of critical commentary becomes louder and more difficult to
ignore with each passing year. That commentary has particularly focused on
two matters: (1) the loss of plaintiff autonomy in MDL proceedings, as
individuals get swept into mass proceedings which are controlled by lawyers
not of their choosing and from which escape is nearly impossible;103 and (2)
the costs of faithless agents, as repeat-player MDL lawyers can carve out
settlements that benefit themselves more than their plaintiffs.104
Many of the proposed remedies for these problems come straight out of
the class-action playbook. One set of reforms seeks to create structures that
monitor the adequacy of the work of lead MDL counsel. For example,
Professors Silver and Miller have proposed establishing a committee of
lawyers who represent the largest number of MDL claimants (and thus have
the largest stake in the case) to select and monitor lead MDL counsel.105 In
a similar vein, Professor Burch argues that third-party funding to finance
multidistrict litigation would result in a large stakeholder (the third-party
funder) with an incentive to monitor MDL counsel.106 Professor Burch has
also assayed a different idea, arguing that imposing greater controls over the
class action device could substantially undermine basic notions of democratic accountability by indirectly
(and, often, furtively) transforming the essential nature of the substantive rights being enforced.”). The
same critique can be leveled against modern multidistrict litigation. See Mullenix, supra note 13, at 564
(“[T]he argument may be made that the new models of nonclass aggregate dispute resolution represent
an even more compelling illustration of the death of democratic dispute resolution.”).
100
We do not necessarily credit this view, but we note that the prevailing concern about class
actions’ costs have created the conservative approach to class actions reflected in the opinions rejecting
class certification cited supra notes 40–43.
101
Bradt, supra note 92, at 1742 (“[T]he arguments that provoked the limitations originally installed
in Rule 23(b)(3) are now forcefully made against actual practice in MDL.”).
102
See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of MDL).
103
See, e.g., Redish & Karaba, supra note 13, at 151 (“Measured in terms of autonomy, paternalism,
utilitarianism, or dignitary theories, procedural due process demands considerably more protection of the
individual litigants’ interests than MDL provides.”).
104
See, e.g., Burch, supra note 37, at 1298 (“Settlement agreements requiring nearly unanimous
consent pressure plaintiffs' attorneys to push their clients to acquiesce so they can collect their fees.”);
Silver & Miller, supra note 16, at 146 (“[F]orced aggregation may saddle claimants with agency costs
by putting them at the mercy of lawyers they cannot control or discharge.”).
105
Silver & Miller, supra note 16, at 176 (recommending “implementation of a default mechanism
. . . that would place MDLs under the control of management committees composed of attorneys with
valuable client inventories”).
106
Burch, supra note 37, at 1315 (“[I]t is . . . possible to overlay the financier's incentives with the
plaintiffs’ incentives such that the financier, who has litigation expertise, sophistication, and substantial
capital involved, will monitor the attorney and counterbalance the attorney’s incentives in ways that
thwart at least some of the agency problems.”).
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fees of lead MDL counsel might help to control agency costs. She has also
suggested a structural protection akin to Rule 23(e)(4)’s discretionary timeof-settlement opt-out opportunity: automatic remand of non-settling
plaintiffs’ cases to their transferor forums.108 Approaching the same problem
from the viewpoint of substantive fairness rather than procedural safeguards,
Professors Bradt and Rave suggest that MDL judges be allowed to weigh in
on the fairness of an MDL settlement—not exactly Rule 23’s full right of
approval or rejection—but at least an information-forcing mechanism that
“would send a signal directly to litigants about whether they ought to opt
into the agreement.”109
Legislative and rulemaking proposals to regulate MDL proceedings do
not borrow as directly from class-action safeguards. A bill that has passed
the House of Representatives110 would institute three checks on the power
of MDL judges: requiring the use of “fact sheets” as a case-management tool
to weed out factually unsupported claims;111 limiting the ability of a
transferee judge to conduct a trial in any case transferred into or filed directly
in the MDL proceeding unless all parties consent; and authorizing appellate
review of any pretrial order of a transferee judge when “an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of” the MDL
proceeding.112 On the rulemaking front, the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules has recently formed a subcommittee to explore the creation of rules to
govern the work of transferee judges.113
107
See Burch, supra note 13, at 147 (arguing for compensating lead MDL counsel on a quantum
meruit basis where awards depend on a variety of factors, including the lead lawyers’ opportunity costs,
financial risks, billing practice,; case status, and time spent).
108
See id. at 153 (“[T]ransferee judges should issue a standing order indicating that they will
automatically request that the Panel remand non-settling plaintiffs to their court of origin after leaders
negotiate a master settlement.”).
109
Bradt & Rave, supra note 60, at 1306–07.
110
See Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of
2017, H.R. 985, § 105, 115th Cong. (2017) (listing new procedural requirements for multidistrict
litigation). The bill passed the House on March 9, 2017, but died in the Senate. Lydia Wheeler, House
Passes Bill to Curb Class Action Lawsuits, THE HILL (Mar. 9, 2017, 7:22 PM),
https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/323313-house-passes-bill-to-curb-class-action-lawsuits.
111
Fact sheets were used to great effect in the asbestos MDL, clearing away a backlog of thousands
of cases. See Robreno, supra note 55, at 136–38 (discussing the use of a case-management order requiring
MDL asbestos plaintiffs to submit the medical opinions they relied on for their claimed injuries and
noting that “[s]imilar orders have been entered by courts presiding over mass tort litigation in a growing
number of cases”).
112
H.R. 115–985, § 105 (2017).
113
Amanda Bronstad, Federal Rules Advisory Panel to Eye Litigation Financing—Sort of, NAT’L
L.J.
(Nov.
8,
2017,
7:23
PM)
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/sites/nationallawjournal/2017/11/08/federal-judicial-panel-toconsider-litigation-financing-sort-of/ (reporting that U.S. District Judge John Bates, chair of the Advisory
Committee, suggested creating a subcommittee to take up a package of proposals to amend multidistrict
litigation procedures). Most of the subcommittee’s work will travel over the same terrain as the House
bill, exploring whether to require a means to test the validity of MDL claims at the outset, limit bellwether
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This ferment for reform reflects the difficulties of meeting multidistrict
litigation’s dual promise: achieving efficiency through aggregation while
retaining litigant control.114 This “split personality . . . becomes more
untenable” as multidistrict litigation grows in size and importance.115
Despite these pressures, multidistrict litigation is far from indefensible.
Multidistrict litigation resolves transferred cases at a fraction of the cost of
individual litigation.116 Without these efficiencies, many cases that fall into
an MDL proceeding might never be filed at all—only the prospect of MDL
treatment makes them viable. Defendants and courts also need a mechanism
to bring repetitive litigation to an end, and in the absence of class actions,
multidistrict litigation is the best available alternative.
The issue, therefore, is how multidistrict litigation should evolve to
address emerging concerns while preserving its core benefits.
III. WHERE WE SHOULD GO
The present posture of multidistrict litigation suggests two diametrically
opposed directions for its future. One direction continues multidistrict
litigation down its present path, bringing the process into closer alignment
with class actions. The logical endpoint of this path is the conversion of the
MDL process into an opt-in class action. The other direction is to roll back
multidistrict litigation to a mechanism for conducting consolidated
discovery—and no more. We then consider whether a blend of the two
models is feasible.
A. Toward an Opt-In Class Action
The most likely evolutionary path for multidistrict litigation is
“forward” toward a regulatory model that extends the power of the transferee
judge. Start with the low-hanging fruit: appointment of lead MDL counsel
and approval of global MDL settlements. Despite murky authority to do so,
transferee judges have long claimed the power to appoint lead counsel to
represent MDL plaintiffs.117 A regulatory model would create a rule, akin to
trials, and permit appellate review of certain MDL orders. The subcommittee might also examine whether
to craft a Federal Rule requiring disclosure of third-party financing arrangements. See CIVIL RULES
ADVISORY COMM., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 10–12 (Dec. 6, 2017),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-12-6-civil_rules_committee_report.pdf.
114
See Bradt, supra note 92, at 1742 (discussing MDL’s loss of control of individual plaintiffs when
MDL was “meant to avoid fears about the mass tort class action”).
115
Id.
116
See Susan M. Olson, Federal Multidistrict Litigation: Its Impacts on Litigants, 13 JUST. SYS. J.
341, 349 (1988–89) (discussing the cost-sharing benefits for plaintiffs and even noting that “[o]ne heart
valve attorney said he ‘probably would have fallen by the way or settled for a nominal amount without
the MDL’”).
117
See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text (discussing judge’s use of inherent judicial power
to appoint MDL lead counsel).
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Rule 23(g)(1), that explicitly confirms the appointment power. The logical
standard for appointment, also borrowed from Rule 23(g)(1), is fair and
adequate representation.118 This representation both requires legal
competence and prohibits collusive behavior or counsel’s simultaneous
representation of MDL plaintiffs with conflicting interests.119
An adequate-representation requirement is dictated by an MDL model
designed to resolve litigation in the transferee forum.120 As long as the MDL
process addressed only matters of common interest, such as efficiently
conducting discovery, conflicts among MDL plaintiffs on non-common
matters could be tolerated. As multidistrict litigation has evolved to become
the final stop in resolving mass disputes, however, the concern that counsel
has an incentive to sell out the interests of some plaintiffs has spread like an
oil slick across the MDL process;121 and the myth of client consent, often
coerced or ill informed, can no longer hide the stain. The proper remedy is
to demand that lead MDL counsel adequately represent the group.122 The
scope of the representation that is deemed adequate will hinge on the scope
of the MDL proceeding. As an MDL proceeding expands from matters of
common discovery to discussions about global settlement or bellwether
trials, the inquiry into competence and conflicts must also expand. And the
inquiry may defeat some MDL consolidations (just as the adequaterepresentation requirement of Rule 23 can scuttle some class actions).123
The regulatory model for multidistrict litigation also recognizes the

118
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(A) (listing specific factors that a judge appointing class counsel
must consider); FED R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B) (permitting the judge to “consider any other matter pertinent
to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class”); Silver & Miller, supra
note 16, at 160–66, 169 (discussing the mechanisms to ensure adequate representation, which involves
appointing a Plaintiffs’ Management Committee to propose lead MDL counsel, and relying on litigation
funders to monitor counsel behavior); Burch, supra note 37, at 1276–77 (discussing the potential for
private monitoring through third-party financiers and the American Bar Association’s Commission on
the ethics of alternative litigation financing). Employing other means is a matter likely to be left to the
transferee judge’s discretion.
119
See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44 (1940) (holding that the Due Process Clause denies
preclusive effect to a class judgment when class members have conflicts of interest or class counsel acts
collusively with opposing counsel); De Lage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Rasa Floors, LP, 269 F.R.D.
445, 462 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (rejecting as class counsel a lawyer who was “qualified and experienced” but
who had no class-action experience and who would have been required to represent plaintiffs with
conflicting interests).
120
See Burch & Williams, supra note 38, at 1530–31 (“Multidistrict litigation is designed to
promote pretrial efficiency and consistency without altering core due process rights such as adequate
representation . . . .”).
121
See Rave, supra note 61, at 2177 (“The risk that MDL settlements can include terms that benefit
the negotiating parties more than claimants is well recognized.”).
122
See De Lage Landen, 269 F.R.D. at 461 (describing the requirement of adequate representation
under Rule 23(a)(4) and discussing whether the attorney is capable of representing the class and if there
are conflicts).
123
See id. at 462 (denying class certification in part due to inadequacy of class counsel).
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transferee judge’s power to approve or reject global settlements. Given
the tactics that lead MDL counsel or individual counsel can employ to obtain
client consent to an MDL settlement, consent has proven to be an insufficient
and largely fictional check on inadequate representation.125 Like the power
to appoint counsel, the power to review MDL settlements is a slight but
logical step beyond existing law. Judges’ capacious case-management
powers already influence the shape of MDL settlements.126 In addition,
parties sometimes negotiate judicial review into the terms of the settlement
agreement,127 and, as we have seen, transferee judges are starting to assert
the authority to review global MDL settlements.128 As the class-action
experience shows, judicial review of MDL settlements will not filter out all
inadequate settlements or self-dealing by lead MDL counsel.129 But review
is also far from toothless, especially when coupled with auxiliary doctrines
borrowed from the law of class actions—in particular, a requirement that
MDL plaintiffs receive notice of the settlement and an opportunity to file
objections with the transferee judge.130
Judicial review of MDL settlements entails establishing a standard of
review. It seems unlikely that the standard presently applicable to class
124
See Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 123, 182 (2012) (“[There is] an emerging opt-in paradigm for mass tort settlements in the postclass action era and [it] clarifies the role for the judiciary to play as mass tort litigation is increasingly
settled in this new, unfamiliar, and private way.”).
125
See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the encouragement to settle and the
changing role the lead attorney has in settlement).
126
See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(A)–(P) (describing a range of case-management powers, including
the power to take appropriate action with respect to “settling the case,” “adopting special procedures for
managing potentially difficult or protracted actions,” and “facilitating in other ways the just, speedy, and
inexpensive disposition of the action”); Erichson, supra note 86, at 1017–19 (discussing mechanisms by
which judges can facilitate settlement).
127
For circumstances in which the law requires or the parties negotiate for judicial review of a
settlement, see Grabill, supra note 124 at 129–38.
128
See supra notes 86, 93 and accompanying text (discussing instances when judges rejected
settlement agreements and whether judges have the authority to do so).
129
See, e.g., In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 881 F.3d 679, 707 (9th Cir. 2018) (rejecting
approval of class-action settlement in part because the district court failed to consider the value that the
settlement added to the defendant’s voluntary reimbursement program and set attorney’s fees
accordingly); Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 725–26, 729 (7th Cir. 2014) (reversing the district
court’s approval of a settlement when, among other reasons, the court did not estimate the likely value
of the claims at trial and the $90 million estimate of the class’s expert accountant appeared to be inflated
in relation to the actual claims that class members filed against the settlement fund).
130
Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring “the best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort” for opt-out class actions). Because each MDL plaintiff is known, providing notice will be neither
more difficult nor more costly than the present process for notifying MDL plaintiffs. Other protections
for class members in mandatory or opt-out class actions are unwarranted. For instance, substituted notice
for unknown class members is unnecessary because each MDL plaintiff is known. Nor, because each
plaintiff enjoys the right to reject the settlement, is an opt-out opportunity at the time of settlement
needed.
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actions—that the settlement must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate”131—
can be improved. This standard will lead judges to reject indefensibly weak
MDL settlements. Prolonging some MDL proceedings is the necessary price
of greater judicial control.
Powers to appoint lead counsel and review settlements will go a long
way to curb the perceptions of lawlessness and self-dealing that infect
present debates about multidistrict litigation. In view of emerging precedent
and a sense of best practices, these changes seem destined to happen—and
likely sooner than later. These changes signal an end to the fiction that client
consent is a sufficient bulwark against MDL counsel who overreach.
Providing two more powers to transferee judges would complete
multidistrict litigation’s transformation into an opt-in process: (1) explicit
authority to approve fees paid both to lead MDL counsel and to the
plaintiffs’ original lawyers; and (2) authority to transfer MDL cases for all
purposes, including trial, to the transferee forum. Regarding fees, the power
of the transferee judge to set the fee of lead MDL counsel for undertaking
work of benefit to all MDL plaintiffs is already beyond doubt.132 Although
the power to control the fees of the MDL plaintiffs’ original lawyers is more
controversial,133 exercising judicial control over all fees is inevitable once
the notion of judicial control supplants the fiction of individual consent.
Indeed, a transferee judge’s power to regulate fees is part and parcel of the
power to review settlements; it is impossible to evaluate a settlement’s
fairness without examining the share of the total proceeds that lead and
original counsel both receive. Admittedly, the argument for fee regulation
has less salience when MDL cases proceed to trial. But as we describe in the
next paragraph, the regulatory model also posits that MDL trials will occur
in the transferee forum, thus undercutting any argument that original counsel
deserves a large percentage of an MDL plaintiff’s recovery.134
Providing transferee judges the power of self-transfer closes the loop
and ensures that they enjoy plenary power over an MDL proceeding. MDL
131

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). Opacity is perhaps the only critique of this standard. But courts have
developed a series of factors to put meat on these open-ended words. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462–63 (2d Cir. 1974) (listing nine factors to evaluate the merits of a class
settlement), abrogated on other grounds by Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir.
2000). An amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, slated to become effective on December
1, 2018 breaks the standard into four factors, one of which involves four subfactors. See COMMITTEE ON
RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 23–27, app. C–12 to C–14 (Sept. 2017),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-09-jcus-report_0.pdf (proposing an amendment to FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)).
132
Supra note 87 and accompanying text.
133
Supra note 93 and accompanying text.
134
It is important to note that judicial approval of fees does not mean that an MDL plaintiff’s
original lawyer will receive no fee. The original lawyer can still obtain a fee for any work that was
performed and was reasonably necessary to advance the client’s interests.
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courts exercised this power until Lexecon ended the practice in 1998. In
the ensuing years, Congress repeatedly attempted to overturn Lexecon. In
1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005, the House voted in favor of bills “to allow a
judge to whom a case is transferred to retain jurisdiction over certain
multidistrict litigation cases for trial.”136 In 1999, the Senate amended the
House bill, keeping the language to overrule Lexecon but deleting other
jurisdictional provisions that the House proposed; the two chambers were
unable to reconcile their differences and the Lexecon fix, to which both
chambers agreed, never became law.137
Therefore, it is not difficult to imagine Congress giving transferee
judges the power to conduct MDL trials. In an increasing number of MDL
proceedings, transferee judges already conduct bellwether trials that set the
table for global settlements.138 Some MDL courts have also effectively
worked around Lexecon by using a “Lexecon waiver.”139 Although present
legislative and rulemaking proposals suggest that the pendulum has swung
away from self-transfer for the time being,140 self-transfer completes the
consolidation of power in the transferee court—a consolidation that reflects
the clear direction of present multidistrict litigation.
The powers that this regulatory model posits—appointing counsel,
reviewing settlements, approving counsel fees, and consolidating cases for
all purposes—strike the balance between efficiency and autonomy decidedly
in favor of efficient single-forum resolution. Only remnants of litigant
135
See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35, 38–40 (1998)
(abolishing the practice of self-transfer); supra notes 25–32 and accompanying text (describing the
practice of self-transfer).
136
H.R. REP. 106-276, at 1 (1999); H.R. REP. 107-14, at 1 (2001); H.R. REP. 108-416, at 1 (2004);
H.R. REP. 109-24, at 1 (2005).
137
145 CONG. REC. 27,055–56 (1999); The Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2
(2006) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts)
(“The House of Representatives has passed legislation to address the Lexecon decision—the so-called
‘Lexecon fix’—in the 106th, 107th, and 108th Congresses. The Senate passed its own Lexecon fix in the
106th Congress as well . . . . None of these bills has become law to date, however.”). The Senate also
continued to consider its own bills to overturn Lexecon. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. 15,936–37 (2006)
(stating that the purpose of the bill is “[t]o amend title 28, United States Code, to allow a judge to whom
a case is transferred to retain jurisdiction over certain multidistrict litigation cases for trial, and for other
purposes.”).
138
See Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 580–89 (2008)
(describing the use of bellwether trials in mass-tort and human-rights contexts); Fallon et al., supra note
29, at 2332–37 (describing the modern “informational” use of bellwether trials in mass-tort multidistrict
litigation).
139
Under a “Lexecon waiver,” the parties in a case that is transferred into an MDL proceeding (or
a defendant in a case that is directly filed in the transferee court) agree to waive objections to trial of the
case in the transferee forum. These waivers must be done on a case-by-case basis; they are therefore
costly, and the relevant parties may refuse to give consent. See Fallon et al., supra note 30, at 2356–60
(describing the process for and logistical difficulties of Lexecon waivers).
140
See supra notes 110–113 and accompanying text.
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autonomy remain. Save for an appointed class representative, this regulatory
model converts multidistrict litigation, for all intents and purposes, into an
opt-in class action.
The regulatory model is complete, save for a final structural concern. At
present, class actions can be, and often are, a part of multidistrict
proceedings.141 Converting the MDL process into an opt-in class action
requires an allocation mechanism to determine whether a particular
proceeding should be a mandatory, an opt-out, or an opt-in class action.
Creation of this mechanism in turn raises questions about the roles of
the Judicial Panel and the transferee judge. At present, the Panel makes the
decision to transfer; the transferee judge makes the decision to certify (or not
certify) a class. Carrying this arrangement forward into an opt-in world, the
Panel would make the decision whether to treat related cases on an opt-in
basis, while the transferee judge would make the decision whether to convert
the cases into an opt-out or mandatory class action.
This split in decision-making authority strikes us as undesirable. One
person or entity should make the determination about the proper form of
class action for a case. The logical entity is the Judicial Panel. The Panel
must make the first decision: whether to consolidate related cases into an
opt-in class. It would not be difficult for the Panel to decide at that time
whether a form of class treatment other than an opt-in class makes more
sense. If it does, the Panel can certify the proceeding as a mandatory or optout class action and transfer it to an appropriate district judge for handling.
The same is true if the Panel determines that an opt-in class is the proper
approach.
Establishing a single institution to make allocative decisions between an
opt-in or opt-out process is hardly fanciful. In the United Kingdom, the
Competition Appeal Tribunal, which has jurisdiction over a range of matters
akin to American antitrust law, has recently received the power to decide
whether a collective action should proceed on an opt-in or opt-out basis.142
The Tribunal serves as a model for the allocative power that our regulatory
model assigns to the Judicial Panel.
Placing class-certification decisions in the hands of the Panel will
generate clear benefits. The Panel is comprised of seven federal judges
versed in complex matters,143 so the decisions regarding class certification
will be well-considered. Greater uniformity in the law of class actions will

141

See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
See Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, SI 2015/1648, R. 79(3) (Eng.) (listing factors to
be considered by the Tribunal in “determining whether collective proceedings should be opt-in or optout”).
143
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2012) (“The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation shall consist of
seven circuit and district judges . . . .”).
142
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144

develop. States are increasingly developing a single, specialized court to
handle complex litigation or large commercial disputes.145 Investing the
Panel with the authority to organize a geographically dispersed dispute helps
the federal system keep pace. Increasing the role of the Judicial Panel also
checks the largely ungoverned power of the transferee judge.
The regulatory model will also produce side effects with more debatable
merit (or demerit). There will be fewer multidistrict proceedings, as some
consolidations will stumble on the adequacy hurdle. In addition, fewer
consolidated cases will be settled, as transferee judges reject weak
settlements. And more cases involving mass injuries may remain unfiled or
flee to state court, as lawyers seeking to avoid regulatory control over their
fees either decline to represent plaintiffs in mass-injury disputes or file their
cases in state court.
An empowered Judicial Panel also raises practical questions—including
the right to appeal Panel determinations, the right of the Panel to supervise
other case-management decisions of the transferee judge, and the
circumstances in which (and by whom) a case might be converted from one
class-action form into another—that need not detain us. Our goal is to sketch
a model of what MDL proceedings are likely to become if we follow present
trends to their logical conclusion. And the conclusion is difficult to resist.
Legal institutions and judges do not give up power readily, and they often
seek to add to the power that they already possess, especially when
justifications such as greater efficiency and lower agency costs lie behind
the maneuver. Nothing to date suggests a different denouement for
multidistrict litigation.
B. Back to Discovery Coordination
Although the momentum in multidistrict litigation points toward greater
judicial control, an alternative is possible. Under a second discoverycoordination model, the MDL process would return to its roots as a
mechanism to complete common discovery. When that discovery is finished,
cases must be remanded to their transferor forums for further proceedings—
whether trial, settlement, termination on pretrial motion, or voluntary
dismissal.
This model avoids many of the problems infecting the modern MDL
process—problems that arise largely because multidistrict litigation has
become a center to resolve mass disputes. Concerns for adequate
representation do not go away when lawyers represent a group of MDL
144
Perfect uniformity will not occur because individual district judges will make class-certification
determinations when no related actions are filed in other federal districts.
145
See Benjamin F. Tennille et al., Getting to Yes in Specialized Courts: The Unique Role of ADR
in Business Court Cases, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 35, 39–40 (2010) (noting that, as of 2010, at least
nineteen states had created complex-litigation or commercial courts “based upon procedural
complexity”).
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plaintiffs only during discovery, but they are significantly lessened when the
lawyers focus only on common discovery and the prospect of earning large
fees for global settlements dissipates. A focus limited to common discovery
will also streamline the MDL process. And the autonomy of MDL plaintiffs
is enhanced because, after common discovery, their cases will return to the
forum and lawyer of their choosing. Indeed, remanding cases to their
transferor forums has begun to emerge as a judicially subversive technique
to challenge the conventional wisdom of multidistrict litigation as a massresolution mechanism.146
Given the evolution of multidistrict litigation toward mass resolution,
however, one objection to the discovery-coordinating model is the
impracticality of turning the battleship around to its distant port of departure.
As a legal matter, however, a simple doctrinal change can accomplish the
switch. One of the first and most transformative powers that transferee
judges claimed was the authority to make dispositive pretrial rulings.147 If
that procedure were reversed—if the phrase “coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings” in §§ 1407(a)–(b)148 were interpreted in light of the
Panel’s remand authority in § 1407(b) to exclude the transferee judge’s
power to render globally dispositive pretrial rulings149—the focus of
multidistrict litigation would return to discovery of common issues.
If cases are routinely remanded to their transferor forums for additional
discovery on individual issues, the prospects for global settlements diminish
but are not entirely doomed. In appropriate cases, the transferee judge can
certify a class action, and the parties can seek to settle the case on that basis.
Moreover, after conducting appropriate discovery, lead MDL counsel can
still seek to negotiate a global settlement before—or even after—remand.
With a credible threat of remand at the completion of common discovery,
however, the deal would need to be sufficiently attractive to induce MDL
plaintiffs and their original counsel to sign on the dotted line, which is not
necessarily a bad thing.150

146
See Robreno, supra note 55, at 144 (noting that, after 2009, the asbestos MDL “departed from
this regimen” of seeking to attain a single mass resolution and that “[r]emand was no longer viewed as a
failure, but rather very much as a part of the MDL process”).
147
See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text.
148
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)–(b) (2012).
149
These rulings include motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and evidentiary
rulings that would lead to the dismissal of claims on a global basis. Excluded are dispositive motions
unique to particular cases, such as motions to dismiss a specific defendant due to a lack of personal
jurisdiction or sanctions motions to enforce discovery obligations.
150
Because many cases that end up in an MDL proceeding are filed originally in the transferee
forum, see supra notes 3–4, the transferee judge will retain control of cases filed in the transferee district.
The transferee judge could employ techniques such as bellwether trials to craft a settlement open to
remanded cases. Without a case-dispositive authority, however, the transferee judge is likely to see fewer
of these transferee-forum filings.
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Another objection to the discovery-coordinating model is the arguable
sacrifice of too much efficiency in return for limited gains in autonomy. In
the short term, a return of multidistrict litigation to a discovery-coordinating
device will undoubtedly jolt the federal civil-justice system, which has come
to rely heavily on § 1407 to siphon off a large percentage of its docket. In
the medium term, this approach may suppress the filing of some cases
involving mass harm, especially those that are economically viable
principally because of the prospect of global MDL resolution. In the long
term, the downward trajectory of class actions may reverse to fill the vacuum
that the shrinking of the MDL process creates.
This model also disrupts the referral industry that has sprung up around
multidistrict litigation. At present, feeder firms aggregate claims and funnel
their clients to the lawyers that handle the cases, often grabbing a large chunk
of the potential recovery along the way.151 Disrupting this industry may be
beneficial if it brings an end to the repeat-player phenomenon, whose
competition-stifling effect on legal services has been one of the most
trenchant criticisms of multidistrict litigation.152
The real difficulty for the discovery-coordination model is practical: will
the Panel be willing to wrestle existing power away from transferee judges?
Whether or not it is realistic, however, the discovery-coordinating model is
a Rorschach test. If the idea of dispersing one-third of the federal docket
back to their transferor forums seems naïve or unappealing, then the only
alternative to control the undesirable side effects of the present MDL process
is the regulatory, or opt-in, model.
Unless, that is, the two models can be blended.
C. Both Forward and Back: A Middle Ground
Both the regulatory model and the discovery-coordinating model leave
gaps that the present MDL process, with its amoeba-like flexibility, papers
over. The regulatory model will prevent the mass resolution of cases that fail
to meet the requirements for an opt-in class action, but it may be overkill for
cases that need no more than discovery coordination. The discoverycoordination model will make mass resolution more difficult, at least unless
151
See Morris A. Ratner, Achieving Procedural Goals Through Indirection: The Use of Ethics
Doctrine to Justify Contingency Fee Caps in MDL Aggregate Settlements, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59,
91 (2013) (describing the dichotomy between, on the one hand, lead MDL counsel who “do not
necessarily collect and resolve large numbers of individual claims” but rely on common-benefit set asides
in aggregated proceedings for their fees and, on the other hand, firms “structured to primarily obtain and
warehouse claims for processing and settlement”).
152
See Burch & Williams, supra note 38, at 1531 (arguing that multidistrict litigation must be
adjusted to stimulate competition between repeat-player counsel and others law firms “such that
faithfully representing plaintiffs’ interests becomes more lucrative than playing the long game”); Burch,
supra note 13, at 152–54 (suggesting that automatic remand of MDL cases that do not settle can
destabilize the repeat-player power structure in multidistrict litigation).
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class actions reverse course to compensate for the retreat of multidistrict
resolution.
Fortunately, a middle ground is possible. Recall our suggestion that,
under the regulatory model, the Judicial Panel be empowered to allocate
cases to an opt-in, opt-out, or mandatory class-action track.153 It takes only
a small tweak to add a non-class track into which the Judicial Panel can slot
a consolidated proceeding: a discovery-only track in which the Panel has
authority to choose the counsel to handle the discovery process. In choosing
among the various tracks, the Panel can explicitly weigh concerns like
litigant autonomy, agency costs, and efficient resolution.
A fair question is whether the Panel would ever opt to put cases on a
discovery-coordination track. Although experience with such a reform can
provide the only certain answer, a quiet counter-revolution in favor of
remand at the completion of common discovery may already be
underway.154 At a minimum, forcing the Panel’s hand on the point will make
it confront the costs of using multidistrict litigation as a dispute-resolving
tool and will clarify its expectations for a transferee judge’s mission in an
MDL proceeding.
But we expect the discovery-coordination track will see use. In some
MDL proceedings, the variance in interests among the consolidated parties
may make a class action—whether opt-out or opt-in—impossible to certify.
The Panel may also regard class treatment as an inappropriate response for
other reasons, especially when individual cases have positive value, so that
concerns for litigation autonomy and bet-the-company liability155 make a
class action undesirable. In these cases, a discovery-coordination track may
achieve the best balance among efficiency, autonomy, and the curtailment
of agency costs.
CONCLUSION
Viewed from 30,000 feet, one fascinating aspect of the present MDL
process is how little traction concerns for individual autonomy have, when
those same concerns have so constrained the scope of class actions.156 The
reason is the fig leaf of consent and control that multidistrict litigation
provides: in theory, each MDL plaintiff, rather than a class representative,
remains in charge of making critical litigation decisions. As multidistrict
litigation has become a holding tank for claims awaiting global resolution in
153

See supra notes 143–145 and accompanying text.
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
155
See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that some class
actions force “defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by
fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liability”).
156
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 616 (1997) (“The interests of individuals in
conducting separate lawsuits may be so strong as to call for denial of a class action.” (quoting FED. R.
CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment)).
154
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the transferee forum, that fig leaf has become vanishingly small, and the
problems of an MDL process with few clear limits on the conduct of repeatplayer lawyers and judges have been exposed.
These problems generate the turbulent energy that will drive
multidistrict litigation’s continued evolution over the next segment of its
lifespan. Many of the extant proposals for reform have tried to leave
multidistrict litigation in its present no-man’s land, importing controls
associated with class actions while avoiding the conversion of multidistrict
litigation into a class action. But the momentum that such controls create
will likely propel multidistrict litigation toward some form of opt-in class
action.
That momentum will then leave a void—a lack of any judicial form to
handle cases that might benefit from common discovery but that fail to meet
the demanding protective requirements of a class action. Preserving a role
for multidistrict litigation in such cases is valuable. A structure that allocates
cases to their best track—opt-in class action, opt-out class action, mandatory
class action, or discovery-only proceeding—is logical.
It is also necessary. Judicial pragmatism and the desire to be efficacious
have crafted multidistrict litigation into a vital part of the American litigation
landscape. Those same qualities have led judges and lawyers to turn a blind
eye to some of the more ethereal values of American justice, such as litigant
autonomy and adequate representation. The blended model that we have
proposed is no panacea, but it creates a blueprint for a multidistrict process
that is sustainable for the next fifty years.

